

## Message Text

SECRET

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00  
INRE-00 ACDA-12 DOEE-00 /038 W  
-----044529 081918Z /43  
O 081847Z MAY 78  
FM USMISSION GENEVA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9348  
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 GENEVA 07013

EXDIS USCTB

PASS TO DOE

E.O.11652:XGDS-3  
TAGS: PARM US UK UR  
SUBJECT: CTB NEGOTIATIONS: TECHNICAL WORKING GROUP MEETING  
MAY 8, 1978

CTB MESSAGE NO.196

1. AT FIRST TECHNICAL WORKING GROUP MEETING OF ROUND,  
FINCH (US) SUMMARIZED MAIN POINTS OF US ILLUSTRATIVE TEXT  
ON NATIONAL SEISMIC STATIONS (NSS) AND TABLED TEXT  
(SEPTEL). TARASOV (USSR) DESCRIBED PAPER AS SERIOUS  
DOCUMENT MERITING CAREFUL STUDY, AND ASKED PRELIMINARY  
QUESTION ABOUT WHAT VERIFICATION US PROPOSED FOR THE  
TWELVE MONTHS PRIOR TO INSTALLATION OF NSS EQUIPMENT.  
FINCH REPLIED BY STRESSING THAT EQUIPMENT FOR NSS WOULD BE  
DEPLOYED AS SOON AS IT BECAME AVAILABLE, BUT -- FOR  
INITIAL NSS -- NOT LATER THAN TWELVE MONTHS AFTER ENTRY  
INTO FORCE. THE US HAD NO SPECIFIC PROPOSALS FOR OTHER  
INTERIM MEASURES BUT WAS PREPARED TO DISCUSS THE MATTER

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FURTHER. FAKLEY (UK) SUGGESTED THAT DATA FROM EXISTING  
NATIONAL STATIONS COULD BE EXCHANGED IN THE PERIOD BEFORE  
NSS EQUIPMENT BECAME AVAILABLE.

2. DATE OF NEXT MEETING WAS LEFT FOR LATER DETERMINATION.

3. FINCH TALKING POINTS ON ILLUSTRATIVE NSS TEXT, WHICH

WERE PASSED INFORMALLY TO SOVIETS FOLLOW:

BEGIN TEXT: DURING THE RECESS, THE US HAS CONTINUED TO CONSIDER ISSUES INVOLVED IN SEPARATE VERIFICATION AGREEMENT, AND HAS STUDIED SOVIET POSITION CAREFULLY.

WITH RESPECT TO INTERNAL SEISMIC INSTALLATIONS, AMBASSADOR WARNKE HAS STATED OUR OBJECTIVES. IN ORDER FOR THESE STATIONS TO PERFORM THEIR VERIFICATION FUNCTION EFFECTIVELY, WE BELIEVE IT ESSENTIAL THAT:

-- THEY OPERATE CONTINUOUSLY

-- PARTIES RECEIVE ALL OF THE SEISMIC DATA

-- GENERAL LOCATIONS BE SPECIFIED IN THE AGREEMENT, ALONG WITH PROCEDURES FOR SITE SELECTION, INSTALLATION AND MAINTENANCE

-- INSTALLATIONS HAVE RELIABLE EQUIPMENT WITH CHARACTERISTICS SUCH AS THOSE THE US HAS PRESENTED, AND THAT THESE BE STATED IN THE AGREEMENT OR ASSOCIATED DOCUMENTS (NOT LEFT UNTIL A LATER DATE)

-- DATA BE AUTHENTICATED AND OF HIGH QUALITY, AND TRANSMITTED IN REAL TIME OR WITH ONLY A SLIGHT DELAY.

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IN THE US VIEW, THE JCC WILL HAVE AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN IMPLEMENTATION OF PROVISIONS FOR INTERNAL SEISMIC STATIONS, INCLUDING ANY ADJUSTMENT OF TARGET DATES NEEDED TO MATCH EQUIPMENT AVAILABILITY.

WE HAVE CONSIDERED VIEWS OF OTHER DELEGATIONS AS TO HOW BEST TO EMBODY THESE OBJECTIVES IN TEXT. ON THE BASIS OF THIS REVIEW, WE HAVE PREPARED NEW ILLUSTRATIVE TEXT WHICH INCLUDES MANY CHANGES DESIGNED TO FACILITATE AGREEMENT:

1. THE ACTUAL ARTICLE IS SHORT AND CONCISE, AND SIMILAR TO THE SOVIET TEXT OF MARCH 15. CHARACTERISTICS OF EQUIPMENT AND DETAILS OF PROCEDURES ARE SET FORTH IN A TECHNICAL ANNEX.

2. WE CAN AGREE TO CHARACTERIZE THE FUNCTIONS OF THE STATIONS, AS IN THE SOVIET DRAFT, IN TERMS OF AN EXCHANGE OF SEISMIC DATA. THE STATION LOCATIONS WOULD BE AGREED BETWEEN US. WE COULD AGREE EITHER TO A BILATERAL EXCHANGE ONLY, OR TO A PLAN WHEREBY ALL SUCH STATIONS WOULD ALSO BE DEDICATED TO THE INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE OF SEISMIC DATA. OUR NEW DRAFT CONTEMPLATES DEDICATING ALL SUCH

STATIONS TO THE INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE.

3. WE CAN USE SOVIET WORKING PAPER'S TERM "NATIONAL SEISMIC STATIONS" TO REFER TO THE INSTALLATIONS.

4. WE CAN AGREE FULLY WITH THE SOVIET DELEGATION THAT THE PURPOSE OF THE DATA EXCHANGE IS TO ASSIST IN VERIFICATION, AND THAT THE TREATY AND THE SEPARATE VERIFICATION AGREEMENT SHOULD NOT IN ANY WAY INTERFERE WITH OR JEOPARDIZE THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE PARTIES. WE THEREFORE CAN ACCEPT A CLAUSE, SIMILAR TO THE ONE IN THE SOVIET

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INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00

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-----044567 081925Z /43

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FM USMISSION GENEVA

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INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

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WORKING PAPER, STATING THAT THE STATIONS AND PROCEDURES WOULD BE EMPLOYED EXCLUSIVELY FOR SUPPLYING DATA USEFUL FOR VERIFYING COMPLIANCE WITH THE TREATY.

5. TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE VIEWS OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION REGARDING MANNING OF THE STATIONS, WE CAN ALSO ACCEPT A CLAUSE, SIMILAR TO THE ONE IN THE SOVIET WORKING PAPER, SPECIFYING THAT THE STATIONS WILL BE OPERATED BY NATIONAL PERSONNEL.

6. WE HAVE ALSO INCLUDED A CLAUSE, IN RESPONSE TO CONCERNS EXPRESSED BY THE SOVIET DELEGATION, SPECIFYING THAT ONLY A PARTY ON WHOSE TERRITORY A STATION IS LOCATED MAY SEND COMMANDS TO SUCH A STATION.

7. OUR ANNEX DESCRIBES CHARACTERISTICS OF STATIONS AND

COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT IN LESS COMPLEX AND DETAILED TERMS THAN IN OUR TECHNICAL PAPERS OF THE LAST ROUND. TO FACILITATE REACHING AGREEMENT ON THE EQUIPMENT, AND TO AVOID SERIOUS DIFFICULTIES -- INCLUDING THE NEED FOR  
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SPECIFYING MUCH GREATER DETAIL -- WE PROPOSE THAT THE DOWNHOLE UNIT OF THE STATIONS BE THE ONE THAT IS BEING DESIGNED AND MANUFACTURED BY THE UNITED STATES. ACTUAL FABRICATION OF ALL OF THE EQUIPMENT EXCEPT FOR ENCODING OF THE KEY WORDS IN THE KEY WORD MODULE COULD INCLUDE PARTICIPATION OF TECHNICIANS FROM BOTH SIDES. WE WOULD ALSO BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE THE ABOVE-GROUND PACKAGE, BUT COULD ACCEPT AN ALTERNATIVE PACKAGE, PROVIDED IT IS COMPATIBLE WITH THE DOWN HOLE UNIT. OUR APPROACH TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF THIS EQUIPMENT IS A PRACTICAL ONE, INTENDED TO ADVANCE OUR MUTUAL INTEREST IN BEGINNING A BAN ON NUCLEAR TESTING AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE DATE.

8. IN LINE WITH DR. MOROKHOV'S COMMENT THAT EACH SIDE CAN UNDERTAKE NECESSARY STEPS FOR SITE SELECTION, WE PROPOSE THAT A PARTICIPANT IN THE DATA EXCHANGE HAVE THE OPTION OF OFFERING NOISE DATA FROM A PROPOSED SITE TO THE OTHER PARTICIPANT, ON THE BASIS OF WHICH THE PARTICIPANTS COULD AGREE THAT THE PREDICTED NOISE LEVEL AT BOREHOLE DEPTH WOULD BE SATISFACTORY. IF THE PARTICIPANTS SO AGREED, THE STATION WOULD BE LOCATED AT THE SITE. WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS NOISE LEVELS WITH OUR NEGOTIATING PARTNERS BOTH DURING AND AFTER THESE NEGOTIATIONS, AND WE WOULD HOPE THAT IN MOST CASES SUITABLE SITES COULD BE FOUND UNDER THIS PROCEDURE. UNDER OUR NEW PROPOSAL, A SITE SURVEY INVOLVING SPECIALISTS FROM BOTH PARTICIPANTS WOULD TAKE PLACE ONLY IF THE PARTICIPANTS DID NOT AGREE THAT THE PREDICTED NOISE LEVEL WAS SATISFACTORY, OR IF THE ACTUAL NOISE LEVEL AT AN INSTALLED STATION WAS HIGHER THAN THE PREDICTED NOISE LEVEL.

9. WE HAVE REORGANIZED THE TEXT MORE LOGICALLY AND SIMPLIFIED IT. FOR EXAMPLE, ALL OF THE MATERIAL ON COM-  
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MUNICATIONS SYSTEMS IS IN ONE PLACE. THE TERMS "RECORDING PARTY" AND "COOPERATING PARTY" HAVE BEEN REPLACED.

10. NEW TEXT DOES NOT REFER TO "SEALING" THE BOREHOLE, BUT ONLY TO MAKING IT PRESSURE TIGHT AND TO INCORPORATING

A TAMPER-DETECTING FEATURE.

11. DURING THE LAST ROUND, WE DISCUSSED THE POSSIBILITY OF BEGINNING VERIFICATION BY INSTALLING MODIFIED SEISMIC RESEARCH OBSERVATORIES DURING AN INTERIM PERIOD BEFORE THE NATIONAL SEISMIC STATIONS WERE FABRICATED. IN AN EFFORT TO SIMPLIFY THE PROCESS, HOWEVER, WE HAVE RE-EXAMINED EQUIPMENT AVAILABILITY DATES; WE NOW BELIEVE THAT THE NATIONAL SEISMIC STATION DESIGN DESCRIBED IN THE TECHNICAL ANNEX CAN BE AVAILABLE SOON ENOUGH SO THAT IT WILL NOT BE NECESSARY TO INSTALL SEISMIC RESEARCH OBSERVATORIES, WHICH HAVE TO BE REPLACED AFTER A SHORT PERIOD. WE PROPOSE THAT SINGLE-BOREHOLE STATIONS BE INSTALLED INITIALLY. INSTALLATION OF THE FIRST STATION WOULD TAKE PLACE WHEN THE EQUIPMENT IS AVAILABLE BUT NO LATER THAN 12 MONTHS AFTER THE AGREEMENT ENTERS INTO FORCE. THOSE STATIONS DESIGNATED IN THE ANNEX AS ARRAY STATIONS WOULD BE EXPANDED INTO ARRAYS, THIS PHASE TO BE COMPLETED WITHIN 48 MONTHS AFTER ENTRY INTO FORCE. WE WOULD ALSO BE WILLING TO CONSIDER ADDITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR VERIFICATION PRIOR TO INSTALLATION OF THE FIRST NATIONAL SEISMIC STATIONS.

12. WE HAVE INCLUDED A CLAUSE, SIMILAR TO THE ONE IN THE SOVIET DRAFT, SPECIFYING THAT SPECIFIC MEASURES FOR IMPLEMENTING THE PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY ARTICLE AND TECHNICAL ANNEX WILL BE DEVELOPED BY THE JOINT CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION AND WILL BECOME EFFECTIVE WHEN AGREED UPON BY THE COMMISSION. END TEXT. JOHNSON

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## Message Attributes

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**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
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**Concepts:** SEISMOLOGY, NEGOTIATIONS, COMMITTEE MEETINGS, TECHNOLOGICAL EXCHANGES  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 08 may 1978  
**Decaption Date:** 20 Mar 2014  
**Decaption Note:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 20 Mar 2014  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
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**Disposition Remarks:**  
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**Enclosure:** n/a  
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**Errors:** N/A  
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**Type:** TE  
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**Review Markings:**  
Sheryl P. Walter  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
20 Mar 2014  
**Markings:** Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014